1. The situation is unstable. We have a ceasefire but it isn’t clear if its going to last. This was worth reading from the always excellent Lawrence Freedman at Comment is Freed. His basic point is both sides want a way out of this, but they are struggling to see how to get there.
   
   
2. There are three destabilising new forces at play, the first being religious nationalism. This is the first major clash in Modi’s 3rd term, and with Pakistan led by army head Asim Munir, the hardline religious former spy chief who controls Pakistan’s strategic decision-making, rather than elected PM Sharif. Both sides face huge pressure to act from nationalist media and social media. The disjunction this week has been striking between the calm, measured briefings from India’s excellent foreign secretary vikram misri and the hyperventilation from TV anchors like Arnab Goswami. The FT had a good piece on the Modi / Munir dynamic here.
   
   
3. The second is technological. This conflict looks quite unlike any other between the two sides. Previously there was a kind of grammar to India-Pakistan clashes which both sides understood, for instance involving artillery strikes across the Line of Control (LOC). They do this, we do that. But the use of Turkish made drones against civilian centres is unprecedented. Neither side quite knows how to respond.
   
   
4. Escalation dominance matters here. The idea refers to the ability of a state to escalate a conflict to a level that its opponent cannot match, giving strategic advantage in controlling the pace and scale of conflict. When faced with novel drone attacks, countries may accidentally or deliberately over-respond, to establish deterrence precedents and signal their capability and resolve, especially when norms and rules of engagement remain undefined. This uncertainty around appropriate proportionality with new technologies creates incentives for stronger-than-necessary responses, as states fear appearing weak could invite further aggression and undermine their credibility in future conflicts. We saw quite a lot of this over the last week. Shashank Joshi at the Economist has been writing about this.
   
   
5. The third is a fragmented multipolar geopolitical environment. Its striking that a lot of the serious diplomacy is being conducted by powers in the Middle East, from Saudi and the GCC to Qatar. Europe is playing a role but less visibly. The US still matters a great deal, and quickly claimed credit for the ceasefire. But many questioned if they had really played such a central role. Its a bit a banter heuristic, but it is at least possible that the deal was largely set up by middle powers and then claimed by the US — which would be a curious repeat of the recent Saudi / Iran deal, which was really negotiated by countries like Qatar and Jordan, but was blessed / claimed by China.
   
   
6. The new world is one where it is harder to pressure for restraint. Multipolar diplomacy is messy. Lots of countries are trying to help. But in the end this is unlikely to be as effective as the old world of hegemonic stability, in which both sides were put under pressure by someone like Colin Powell (during the 2001-2002 military standoff following the Indian Parliament attacks) or Condoleezza Rice (who played a crucial role during the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks crisis, shuttling between both countries to ease tensions and facilitate intelligence sharing).
7. It could get a lot worse. International leaders call for restraint. But both sides have actually been restrained. People worry a lot about “the two nuclear armed neighbours”. But the real worry is there are lots of ways to escalate well below that threshold. We haven’t seen jets crossing the LOC, or a mass casualty event, or use of long range ballistic missiles, which would be especially risky, given they can be nuclear-armed. And with luck, we won’t.
   
   
8. Conflict is becoming a new norm. I had a chat with my old friend Pratap Bhanu Mehta yesterday, who made the point that the world is entering a troubling era where this kind of high-tech armed conflict is increasingly normalized, with events from Gaza to Ukraine and South Asia demonstrating the international community’s limited ability to enforce peace. Major powers increasingly view military action as a viable policy option rather than a last resort. This is what the gradual collapse of post-Cold War constraints on interstate violence looks like. Noah Smith made a variant of this point in a gloomy post this week on a new “world of war”.
   
   
9. China’s role as a high-tech military supplier. China’s foreign ministry called India’s operation “regrettable”. In practice, however, China is a close partner of Pakistan and a critical supplier of military technology. A Chinese-made J-10C aircraft operated by Pakistan, equipped with PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, is reported to have conducted its first-known air-to-air kill in live combat by shooting down a France-produced Indian Rafale.
   
   
10. The world is watching — to find out how the kit works. Assuming the reports are correct — the US govt said they were — this would be the first fatal combat interaction of modern Chinese and European fighter jets, demonstrating Chinese technological advances in radar and missiles. It also brings home a debate about the advanced capabilities that China is able and willing to provide for—and co-develop with—its partners, including Russia. And as the FT reported, everyone wants to know how this might pan out.
    
    
11. Europe needs to pick a side. I co-wrote a short piece for ECFR basically arguing that it is in Europe’s strategic interest to be clearer about its support for India. There is a tendency to want to call for restraint from “both sides”. Delhi will judge its international partners based on whether they are supportive of India’s position or take a more neutral stance. This need not be carte blanche. But if Europe wants to promote itself as a reliable, high-tech defence supplier, while emphasising the importance of plans for a new Europe-India security and defence partnership, this comes with diplomatic choices. If the ceasefire collapses expect European nations to prioritise their burgeoning relationship with India over concerns about worsening ties with Pakistan.

Written by James Crabtree